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Abstract

The Role of Institutions in Transition Growth:
The East Asian NIC's
This paper examines the role of institutions in the transition
process of the East Asian "Gang of Four." The stylized facts
characterizing modern growth are discussed, along with the transition
phases to modern growth. The importance of institutional structure
to the sequencing of transitional subphases is explored. The
institutional structure itself is seen to depend on the particular
nature of secularism, egalitarianism and nationalism as defined by
Kuznets in each country concerned.

Contrasts in colonial history and
initial endowments are also considered. The evolution of
institutions accommodating successful transition in East Asia are

explored.

This paper was prepared for the Conference on the Role of
Institutions in Economic Development, Cornell University, 1986.
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Section I

Introduction

By now there is near universal agreement with reference to the relative
success of the so-called East Asian "Gang of Four" in the course of the post
war development effort.

That success has not only permitted them by and large

to grow rapidly but also to do so in the context of eliminating their initial
state of underemploymen t and to maintain, and in some cases even to improve
upon. a fairly egalitarian distribution of income; and, last but not least, to
adjust relatively well to the buffeting administered by the international
economy during the post-1980 period.

Even the critics no longer write these

cases off as instances of unusally heavy dosages of foreign aid or other
"special case" manifestations, e.g. via favored treatment by the U.S. in the
context of the new protectionism.

On the other hand, there is much less

agreement when one tries to proceed beyond a description of that well.known
success story in order to understand why it happened, which presumably is not
irrelevant to the issue of what, if anything, in that experience is useful
elsewhere in the third world.

Here the debate is sharp between those who wax

eloquent about this real world application of pure laissez faire in the
developing economy context, on the one hand, and those who claim that these are
cases of a fairly active and quite intrusive government, on the other.

It is

for this reason that an examination of the role of institutions in the

*Paper prepared for the Conference on the Role of Institutions in Economic

Development, Cornell University, November 1986.
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transition process in this part of the world comes at a rather opportune
moment.
Institutions can be viewed in many ways.

I will simply adhere to the

notion that institutions define how people inhabiting a certain land space and
having command over given resources decide to organize themselves for economic
activity.

Such people are, of course, constrained by, their initial conditions

which include not only the size of country, natural resources, man-land ratios,
etc., but also the quality of the human capital stock in its various
dimensions.

Given these constraints or, if you like, opportunities, how- people

organize themselves to navigate the shoals of successful transition growth is-a
key issue that needs t<? be addressed.

.

In Section II we briefly outline the

dimensions of the developmental task embodied in a successful transition to
modern growth for t:he· East Asian type of developing economy and describe the
nature of the initial conditions underlying the system's institutional and
economic capacity at the outset.

In Section III, we provide some examples of

the role of institutions and institutional change in easing the task of
transition in East Asia.

Sectiori II

Some final thoughts are presented in Section IV.

The Transition to Modern Growth and the Initial Conditions

As is well knoW!1, modern growth is characterized by a number of stylized
facts, including pJ~ominently the sustained routinized application of science
and technology to -.::he production process, accompa·,,ied by accelerated populatio~1

growth, capital deepening, pronounced structural change and the geographic
spread of the process within and across countries.

To the extent we expect

contemporary LDC's to effect the transition into this promised land we can
expect such characteristics to appear in the long run.
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Kuznets was less concerned with analyzing the transition towards that
long-run as he was with describing the characteristics which increasingly had
to be associated with its successful accomplishment.

Historically, the

geographic spread of modern growth from England to the Continent to the
latecomer countries of the West was effected rather smoothly over long
historical periods of time.

In the post war third world, East Asia included,

on the other hand, the effort was made to do this rather quickly under the

telescoping pressures we are all familiar with.

Moreover, there were

additional handicaps in having to shake off colonial constraints plus a rather
deeply rooted agrarian or primary product oriented economic structure which was
partly a function of resource endowments and partly a function of ~hese
colonial strictures.
The transition growth process itself can be viewed as something of a
metamorphic phenomenon characterized by sub-phases occurring in some more or
less definite sequence.

The nature of the transition sub-phases and of a

system's success :i.n navigating them en route to an eventual graduation into
modern growth is constrained by a number of exogenous factors.

Included are

the national physical ~ndowment, the world economic environment, as well as
other aspects of initial conditions on the human side which make up facets of
the institutional dimension which is the focus of this paper.
Given marked differences in the exogenous factors affecting the path of
transition, the sub-phases, each characterized by a somewhat distinct set of
structural characteristics and modes of operation of the economy, will differ,
i.e. there is no inevitability about moving along a fixed historical path.

But

it is important te, recogniz·e that the sequencing of the subphases is related to
differences in both the initial economic and organizational conditions as well
as in the response mechanisms of the system over time.

Institutions thus have
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two characteristics:

one, they are an essential component of the initial

conditions; and, two, they can be classified as either accommodative or
obstructive in terms of the ability of the system to navigate to modern growth
over time.
The beginnings of a transition growth effort may thus be set rather
arbitrarily at the point where the economic system begins to move out of its
agrarian colonial resource allocation and trade pattern when it mainly exports
primary products in return for the importation of manufactured consumer goods
and in exchange for capital goods intended to expand the capacity of the same
enclave sector.

The next subphase almost invariably, including in East Asia,

constitutes an effort at industrialization through early import substitution,
with a new politically independent system capturing control of its foreign
exchange earnings and allocating them to building up the capacity to produce e.t
home the previously imported non-durables.
Import substitut:Lon may be viewed as a nationalistic act, a repudiation of
dependency; thus ideology fits economic expediency.

The new industries are

seen as a way of creating jobs so that the population pressure on the land can
be relieved.

At the same time the pace of labo-r absorption during import

substitution is actually limited by the availability of capital, the frequently
inefficient selection-of technology, as well as the initial shortage of mature
entrepreneurs.
While this subphase is shared by virtually all developing countries, the
choice made at the inevitable end of this subphasa is a crucial one, i.e. given
that the majority of LDC's continue ~ith import substitution, but now shifting,
to the manufacture of capital, durable consumer goods and the processing of

intermediate goods, the East Asian NIC's shifted coward som~thing we have
called primary or easy export substitution, which basically consists of
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exporting into internation al markets the same non-durable consumer goods
previously supplied only to the domestic market.

Then, once labor surplus had

been eliminated, they proceeded to the production and export of the higher
technology, more capital and technology intensive goods exemplified by the
so-called secondary import and export substitutio n output mix.

The East Asian

NIC's which selected this particular path of subphases en route to modern
growth required not only a milder version of primary import substitutio n but
also a substantial shift in the policy mix at its termination .

It is in this

context, i.e. of institution s which are built flexibly at the outset and
accommodate rather than obstruct the achievement of transition growth over
time, that the role of institution s will be examined.

Our focus here will be

more on Korea and Taiwan, the larger and somewhat less atypical representat ives
of the Gang of Four.
Turning to the initial exogenous conditions, we are all familiar with the
fact that the East Asian countries inherited a relatively poor natural
resources base and a heavily labor surplus condition, combined with a
substantial amount of physical infrastruct ure, especially in the rural areas,
inherited from the colonial period.

What is less well understood are the

initial conditions governing the actual or potential role of government in
organizing the system for the ·transition process, i.e. what might be called tte
"political culture" pre-existin g during the early 1950's.
In that context Kuznets has emphasized· the importance of three ingredients
as a system moves towards modern growth, i.e. secularism, egalitarian ism and

nationalism . It is in terms of these dimensions that I believe the basic
success of an

acc:)mmodati ng institution al structure as demonstrate d by a

capacity for accomnodati ng policy changes can be found.
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Secularism is defined by Professor Kuznets to mean a "concentration on life
on earth with a scale of priorities that assigns a high rank to economic
attainment ...

The increased power of man over resources provided by science

that constitutes the basis of the view of man as captain of his destiny in this
world".

Such this-worldliness is certainly part of the initial conditions the

East Asian NIC's could depend upon in the beginning of their transition growth
process.

The often referred to "pragmatism" of the Chinese culture which

suggests that the individual work hard in the context of a stable political
environment and not become politically, ideologically or religiously attached
to vague spiritual values was undoubtedly an important ingredient,
accommodating to innovations in the policy sphere as well as along production
functions.

Secularism in the East Asian NIC's is by no means confined to the

elite; the attitude of "stomach first and spiritual values later" -- just the
reverse as what is often referred to as the "spiritual East" -- is wide-spread.
Salvation is much more likely to be found on this earth through hard work than
by sloganeering or spiritual retreat.
Turning to egalitarianism, Kuznets saw this as a trait which emphasizes the
need for equality of opportunity, not necessari.ly equality of income at the end
of the day.

This i~ consistent with some minimum necessary income inequality

as a consequence of the normal minimal required hierarchy in all human affairs
as well as with various strongly felt social obligations to help the poor.

It

does, however, connote an emphasis an equal access, e.g. through the
competitive examinacions system on the educational front, as well as by
permitting the individual equal access to compete in the work-place, i.e. with
a relatively less than typical dosage of elitism or non-competitive group
manipulation.
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Perhaps most important is the third element, a heritage of nationalism
:;mrich Kuznets defines as "the claim of a community of feelings ground on a

',xommon historical past and its historical heritage

in its extreme form an

overriding claim of allegiance of the members to the larger community and
sovereignty -vis-a-vis all groups beyond that national unity". Thus, while it is
easy to agree that all governments must provide publ~c goods, even in the most
laissez faire Friedmanesq ue camp, the importance of the pre-existen ce of such
an organic nationalism as an initial condition governing the East Asian NIC's

cannot easily be exaggerated .

In contrast to many LDC's at a similar stage of

early transition growth, the East Asian populations already possessed a most
valuable asset in the torm of such an organic nationalism .

As a consequence

they clearly felt a part of a larger community and without having. to address
marked heterogenei tie•s in race, geography, background, etc. by appeals to what
can only be called an artificial or synthetic nationalism .
While economists are understanda bly loathe to put too much weight on
cultural factors, there can be little doubt that the felt need to create a
synthetic type of nationalism when facing marked regional or ethnic or
religious disparities among groups pulling in many different directions all too
frequently leads new LDC governments to overprornise and overcommit and, as a
consequence , to be both unable to carry out the major developmen tal functions
and in danger of losing.thei r credibility early in the game.

The most obvious

example is the much earlier capability of the East Asians to shift from "under
the table" inflation taxes in paying for infrastruct ure and other government
activities to "on the table" explicit tax systems.

The early gift of a

national identity coupled with substantial freedom of individual action can
thus be contrasted with the search for that identity which is often coupled
with much posturing and visible interventio ns by government on behalf of a
skeptical public.

8

Perhaps another ~ay of putting it is that the typical East Asian citizen
thinks of himself as having certain obligations to the state, feels the need to
reach a consensus and not to make too many unreasonable demands on the
government.

This stands in some contrast to other LDC's where the citizen

thinks more of his rights in a struggle with other interest groups petitioning
the government to provide this favor and that as qui~kly as possible.

The

basic confidence in government does not exist; as a consequence the government
_is tempted to do more than it is capable of, loses further credibility, and the
downward cycle continues.
In short, the differences in organizational/institutional choices that one
can discern in looking.at the East Asians in contrast to other LDC's requires a
much more basic definition of "initial conditions" than is usually entertained.
Policy choices clearly do not take place in a vacuum but must be related to an
institutional/organizational typology which is as much a part of initial
conditions as the tried and true resource endowment, factor proportions, size
of country ratios that we usually focus on exclusively.

What political

scientists like Hofheinz and Calder call the "insulated developmentalist
state", i.e. relatively insulated from political pressure groups, does not just
happen.but is very much a function of the kind of pre-existing organic
nationalism with respect to regional, political and ethnic integration of the
population to support the government without expecting too much from it.

Some

economists like Lloyd Reynolds seem to come to somewhat similar conclusions.
After surveying 100 years of development in 40 LDC's Reynolds states that "my
hypothesis is that the single most important explanatory variable is political
organization and the administrative competence of government".

In other words,

the co-existence of egalitarianism, secularism, and organic nationalism
provides for a system of mutual obligations, with the government having a very
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substa ntial role derivin g from the fact that the variou s constit uencie
s assume
·it will utilize it for the common good, based on techno cratic and
not politic al
princip les.

As Chalme rs Johnso n puts it, it is a situati on where techno crats

can rule while the politic ians and/or the militar y reign.
It is, in fact, easy to overst ate the real conten t of plural istic politic
al
openne ss or democr acy in, let us say, Latin Americ a, in contra st to
the East
Asian, one. party martia l law regime s.

It is at least a very good questio n

where politic al and econom ic partici pation or freedom of choice for
the average
citizen and where the chance s of popula r partici pation and an equita
ble
distrib ution of income are more pronou nced.

The freedom of governm ents to

constr uct institu tions and change them as requir.e d to accomm odate the
changin g
econom ic environ ment is clearly much more pronou nced in the East Asian
cases.
We are not at all sugges ting here that man lives by bread alone; only
that we
are entirel y too fixated , in my view, on archety pical cases of superf
icial
politic al democr acy and less willing to examine the possib le extent
of popula r
partici pation and decisio n making within a possib ly highly decent ralized
public
sector in a one-pa rty state.
The initial ponitio ? with respec t to institu tional choice on the mixed
econom y spectru m is thus usually heavily a functio n of initia l condit
ions,
includi ng coloni al history .

in the majori ty of LDC cases, the overse as

territo ries had genera lly witnes sed a fairly strong admin istrativ e
structu re
focusse d on law and order where colonia lism was associa ted with the
rule of th,?.
market under agreeu rules of the game not, of cc-urse , focusse d on
the system 's
develop ment. The ~ffort to change this config uration natura lly yielded
a
certain inheren t initial bias on behalf of governm ent interve ntions
, usually of
the direct or horh:o ntal kind, in most LDCs' early post indepen dence
period .
Given the institu tional precon ditions , there was less need in East
Asia to
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select a particular class to receive particular favors through a direct
allocation system, e.g. import licenses, overvalued exchange rates, cheap
credit, tariff protection, etc. and all the other well known discretionary
decisions which determine who shall live and who shall die.

We have a similar

problem when we identify market orientation with text book laissez faire and
simple-mindedly relegate the ideal role of the state to one that Adam Smith
would find unduly restrictive.
Synthetic nationalism, the effort of a community to ground itself in a
common cause when the basic historical and cultural heritage is not as strong
as it might be, arises in part as a natural consequence of another type of
colonial era.

Consequently the tools of colonialism are often rej ec;:ted along

with the objectives and much of the bias against the use of the market, and
much of the faith in the power of direct government actions in the economic as
well ·as the political sphere, stems from that experience.

Similarly, with

respect to egalitarianism, the denial of inherited differences among
individuals, a legitimate desire to break down an earlier feudalism and thus
move towards greater equality of opportunity is often interpreted as trying to
achieve instead an equa~ity of outcomes -- something that can only be achieved,
with difficulty,

by continuous government intervention after the fact.

here talking about a "secondary" income redistribution

We a~e

rather than a "primary"

income distribution through participation in the market-place.

There is, of

course, also a danger that a this-worldly ~pproach may be translated into the
new national states' ascendancy over religion and translate itself into an
undue faith in the state's capacity to make a large number of directly
allocative decisions across the board in variouLJ markets.
In other words, synthetic nationalism is often associated with inadequate
dosages of egalitarianism and secularism as important ingredients in the
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.:transit ion process . In most develop ing countrie s there exist conside rable
.,doubts in the early transiti on period with respect to the adequac y of the human
:::resour ces, ·their ability to bear risk and to perform vital entrepr eneuria l
::.functio ns.

This, in turn, leads to the much observe d tendency for governm ents

to want to take over these function s or, more fre.quen tly, to attempt
a careful

adminis trative selectio n of people who ought to be more capable than others and
to whom the various required pieces of paper command ing necessa ry inputs
at

subsidiz ed prices ought to be disburse d.
Similarl y, with respect to the relation ship to the working class, there is
a strong tendency for misplac ed egalitar ianism to reflect itself in an early.

emphasi s on minimum wage legislat ion, undue generos ity in governm ent wages, in
fact generall y all practice s which focus on wage rates rather th~n wage bills.

An extreme extensio n-of this, of course, is the early acceptan ce of so-calle d
modern welfare legislat ion, shifting somewha t prematu rely from the family to
the state as a provide r of social and old age insuranc e.

All this is usually

coupled with a strong tendency , again under the influenc e of colonia lism and
the needs of a synthet ic national ism, to try to exclude foreign ers, seen as

having particip ated in the colonia l, market driven, past.
In·this situatio n the interven tion by a group of often Western educate d
civil servants , well intentio ned, eager to cut the colonia l tie and to create
the precond itions for transiti on growth, general ly focussed on the provisio n
of

public goods as a way of assistin g indigeno us element s, seems- fully justifie d

for both ideolog ical and pragmat ic reasons.

It is indeed very understa ndable

that such societie s try to distance themselv es from their heritag e and
initiall y accept the practic al concern of impleme nting infant industry
protect ionist regimes during which entrepre neurs need tempora ry protect ion
against the world of the most advanced countri es, require at the outset
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infrastruct ure and possibly a redistribut ion of assets -- all yielding a
relatively strong bias in favor of direct government interventio n.
The critical question, however,

is whether this first subphase of

transition, which seems to be generally accepted in virtually all developing
countries, is a mild version and lasts for relatively short periods of time, or
an extreme version which continues even when its economic rationale has long
ago petered out.

As already indicated, once this subphase runs out of steam

the vast majority of LDC's choose to persevere with the same policy setting,
now directed towards a new set of goods and fuelled by a combination of natural
resource exports and foreign capital inflows.
The East Asian cas~s, starting off with a larger dosage of organic
nationalism , egalitariani sm and secularism, were able to maintain_ a relatively
short, milder version of the import substitutio n syndrome and thereafter to
move gradually towards the further liberalizat ion of various markets.

This

required substantial ly different economic/o rganization al/ institution al choices
in the course of the transition growth effort, but is a far cry from anything
approaching a reduced role of government or an ideological commitment to
laissez faire.

In fact, I am prepared to argue (see below) that the role of

government became more important in the course of the transition process in
Korea and Taiwan and that the critical issue is tbe continuous flexibility of

institution al and policy change in the effort to organize society's human and
natural resources most effectively rather than any absolute preference for
either a pure market solution or government interventio n.
The overall consistency in the trend of institution al and policy choices
is, moreover, much inore important than the actual average level of
intervention ism.

Korea and Taiwan during the 1960's, for example, were able to

avoid the stop/go experience of so many developing countries which typically
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expe rime nted with perio ds of libe raliz atio n
follo wed by rene wed .rest ricti onis m
and inter vent ion, only to be follo wed by yet
anot her cycl e, furth er incr easi ng
the unce rtain ty on the part of all the part
icip ants . Ther e prob ably exis ts a
gene ral cons ensu s that a polic y more or less
cons isten tly adhe red to, even of a
lowe r avera ge qual ity, is much to be p_re ferre
d to an osci llati ng poli cy defin ed
to be supe rior "on the aver age" .
· Secu laris m embe dded in the Conf ucian philo
soph y of egal itari anis m as
repr esen ted by the com petit ive exam inati ons
syste m and an orga nic natio nalis m
prov iding stron g hist oric al glue to a rela tive
ly raci ally and geog raph icall y
homo geneo us soci ety undo ubted ly were impo rtant
_ini tial cond ition s to be
mob ilize d effe ctiv ely in the cour se of the
tran sitio n grow th effo rt in East
Asia . Thes e featu res cann ot easi ly be crea
ted throu gh prote ction _ and othe r
dire ct inter vent ions ?Y the state , but they
can be prom oted in a soci ety by
intro duci ng addi tion al elem ents of econ omic
and clas s mob ility . In the case of
the East Asia ns thei r init ial adva ntage in
inst ituti onal reso urce s and thei r
disad vant age in natu ral reso urce s undo ubte
dly rein forc ed each othe r by
enha ncing the abil ity of the syste m to overc
ome the resis tanc e of powe rful
vest ed inte rest grou ps to chan ges in inst ituti
ons· and poli cies requ ired for the
common good . In othe r word s, if natio nalis
m can be enli sted on beha lf of the
tran sitio n effo rt rath er than cons titut ing
an obst :ruct ion to it this can be the
sing le most impo rtant expl anat ion of suc.c essfu
l tran sitio n.
Econ omic pragm atism may thus be view ed as a
mixt ure of th~ afore men tione d
thre e elem ents whic h has much to do with the
unle ashin g of human ener gies and
esta blish ing a tigh ter relat ions hip betw een
effo rt and the rewa rd syste m.
Secu laris m real ly cons titut es one pill ar of
this pragm atism via the dedi catio n
to the mate riali sm of secu re surv ival. The
East Asia ns are well known for
thei r secu lar cultu re, leav ing the purs uit
of godl ines s, e.g. Budd hism , to a
smal l mino rity.
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Egalitarianism suggests that social distinctions are to constitute a reward
to those who perform economic tasks with distinction.

The climb along the

social ladder from landless peasantry to land owning status and from there to
entry into the landlord class could be a realistic hope for most in the East
Asian countries.

Thus both the competitive empirical exam and the land tenure

system undergirded egalitarianism as a basis for our observed pragmatism.
Organic ~ationalism, on the other hand, lends wisdom to this art of
sharing, i'.e., it puts limits on egalitarianism and is required for one's
awareness of a common bond of history.

The basic notion remains that

individuals grouped into families, villages or other voluntary associations
must indeed share, but not excessively and less over time.

The extended family

system, for example, which puts limits on egalitarianism in the colonial and
early transition period gradually breaks down as one moves towards mature
growth.

In East Asia there is an increasing belief that, while community

obligations do provide for the less fortunate members of society, the extension

of such concern within the local community or village is to a larger national
conununity, which requires a careful assessment o·f the costs and benefits if
egalitarianism is not to be too severely limite~.

The trick here is to

translate a common consciousness of cultural heritage into behavioral rules
which are conducive to the. institution of a sequence of reforms, including land
reform, tax reform, etc. which, while expressing calculated sympathy with other
members of the community, do not endanger the underlying principle of
egalitarianism as defined by Kuznets.
It is this three tiered composite pragmatism which translates itself into
family self reliance coupled with the intuition that governments' capacity to
"take care of everything" is extremely limited.

Thus pragmatism is conducive

to the gradual depoliticizatio n or market orientation of a system as we have
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witnessed it in East Asia.

Gradually more activity is defined as

material istically or secularly oriented while the community of sharing as
expressed by direct across the board governmen t intervent ion in the productio n
process gradually diminishe s in importanc e.

Thus instituti onal and policy

change must also be viewed in an evolution ary perspecti ve.
The case of high expectati ons concernin g the quick achieveme nt of growth
and income equality through direct governmen t action is almost always bound to

lead to frustratio n, as has been shown in many LDC's.

What usually follows is

a series of erratic policy fluctuatio ns without a clear trend instead of some
linearity in the direction of gradual liberaliz ation.

The problem is that once

vocal demands are set in motion stop/go policy changes are likely to be
adopted, with every change in the finance ministry leading to a new set of
policies, sometimes liberaliz ing, more often reversing the trend.

Let me now

turn to some of the specifics concernin g the role of institutio ns in permittin g
the required pragmm::ic flexibili ty in the East Asian case during its transitio n
growth process.

Section III

Institutio ns and East Asian Transit:i.o n Growth

We do not intend to once again describe the success story of the East Asian
case.

But it is nece~sary to recall that both Korea and Taiwan went through

"easy" import substitut ion phases in the SO's, moved into easy export
substitut ion during the 60's, and, once they reached the end of their unskilled
labor surplus condition in the early 70's, moved on into secondary import and
export substitut ion.

The ability to navigate these subphases represent s a

manifesta tion of changes in institutio ns as they affect various markets within
these economies , both in terms of the macro economic setting as well as the
specific sectoral actions of the governmen t in terms of its manageme nt of the
economy.
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We have already referred to the fact that the typical import substitution
policy mix, including protectionism, import controls, mult"iple exchange rates
and large government budget deficits, coupled with rigid inflation, a

substantial emphasis on public enterprises and a pronounced dedication to the
i~ea of government planning, were all present in the cases of Korea and Taiwan
in the 50's but represented a somewhat milder version by LDC standards for
reasons already referred to.

For example, the fiscal system was, from the

beginning, deployed in the sense of not permitting large scale deficits with
the help of foreign aid but, even during the 50's, accommodated efforts to
shift from inflation finance to tax finance.

In other words, a nearly balanced

budget was viewed early and consistently as having important private and public
value.

As long as LDC governments were still severely limited in their direct

tax capacity; as is true in most cases, indirect taxes were resorted to, but
not only of the import/export tax variety but also via the rice/fertilizer
barter program.

Consolidated income tax reforms were promulgated as early as

1955, for example, in Taiwan, and budgetary surpluses began to appear in the
early 60's.

While there have been more fluctuations in this policy in the case

of Korea the emergence of budget deficits at any point in time consistently
evoked a search for new taxes.

Thus, from the beginning, the East Asians have

tried to move away from "under the table" covert taxation and been able to
increasingly implement rounds of tax reforms to generate adequate direct "on
the table" government revenues.
The institutional framework undergirding the monetary or credit market
supported such general fiscal restraint.

Whenever inflation set in, as it did,

especially in Korea, from time to time, governments usually did not try to
suppress the interest rate by further monetary expansion but permitted that
rate to move up towards its equilibrium value.

It is quite interesting, for
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,example, to note that a high interest rate policy trying to remoye some of the
.;::repression in money markets, now more typical in LDC' s, was initiated in Taiwan
,.;as

early as 1955 and reaffirmed in 1972 after some slippage just at the time

when .1:he rest of the world was about to enter an unprecedented period of

inflation.

This is not to say that there wasn't a good deal of direct credit

allocation in Taiwan and Korea; in fact, the so-called "commercial" banking
system in both is very much a part of the public sector and allocations are
constantly made to particular firms, especially in the case of Korea.

But it

is also true that, viewed in long term perspective, the notion took hold. early
on that money creation is not to be used consistentiy to shift profits to

favored private parties or to state enterprises.
At the same time the role of public enterprise varied substantially in the
1950's in both countr.ies but has continued to be much more important than the
usual liberalization rhetoric would indicate.

By the time Taiwan, for example,

entered into secondary import and export substitution the "ten big projects"
became part of the government's program focussing not only on overheads b~t
also on areas where the government might have a natural monopoly or where the
still rather fledgling capital markets were not able to provide other
alternatives.

This is in no way intended to cont1~adict the fact that the

growth of directly productive activities in the fcrnt growing East Asian
economies has taken plaae primarily in the private sector, only to note one
element of the advertised pragmatism in terms of the continued importance of
directly productive public sector activities over most of the period.
The same point can be made with respect to policies towards the
agricultural sector,

As is well known, land reforms were instituted in both

Korea and Taiwan in the early post-war period, actions which were politically
eased by the fact that land owners could be compensated by the transfer of
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title to industria l assets abandoned by the Japanese, as well as by the fact
that land reform could be promulgat ed by Mainland ers or occupatio n authoriti es
on a domestic landlord populatio n.

The full significa nce of this institutio nal

change may be seen not only in the fact that spatially dispersed farmers were
no longer neglected on .the political stage, as they are in so many other

developin g countries , but also and more importan tly, in that it paved the way
for the deploymen t of a decentral ized non-agric ultural activity to follow,
especiall y in the case of Taiwan and somewhat later in the case of Korea.
A very important additiona l component of this instituti onal success story
is the conversio n of Japanese -built farmers' associati ons into voluntary
associati ons making local infrastru ctural decisions , creating a loc~l
cooperati ve banking network, and helping diffuse both agricultu ral and food
processin g related non-agric ultural technolog y.

The decentral ized nature of

the JCRR-farm ers' associati on structure , as well as that of local governmen t
generally , has been frequentl y commented upon, but its participa tory
implicati ons within a non-demo cratic one-party military governme nt aren't
always given full weight.

This, plus the establishm ent of a unitary and

relativel y flexible exchange rate system after the early 1960's, plus an
approxim ation to price stability , permitted Taiwan's farmers, even though they
were being taxed, to be able to count on no further deteriora tion of their
terms of trade, permittin g them to export labor intensive non-trad itional
commodit ies such as mushrooms and asparagus to the rest of the world.

It is

often forgotten that the first explosion of labor intensive non-trad itional
exports from Taiwan was in these agricultu ral products.
The subsequen t dramatic success of the East Asian NIC's in exporting labor
intensive manufactu red goods during the export substitut ion subphase of the
60's is well known.

What is less well known is that even here there was only a
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partial liberalizati on in effect in terms of the protection afforded to these
industries. It is true that foreign exchange institution s had been gradually
depoliticiz ed, starting with the reduction of the import licensing and quota
system in the late SO's and early 60's, as well as the shift from overvalued
multiple to realistic unitary exchange rates approaching a managed floating peg
system by the 1970's.
But it is also true that protection and directional controls remained
fairly substantial throughout the period.

The government, for example,

continued to provide political favors to specific urban industries both overtly
and covertly, e.g. through direct credit allocation, interest rate
differentia ls and exempting certain "new and strategic" industries from
corporate taxes, for example.

This package of policies reflects an awareness

that while increased competitive ness of domestic producers is crucial for the
ultimate penetration of foreign martets in the labor surplus economy domestic
consumers can and should be exploited as long as it is politically feasible,
i.e. the sequential order of East Asian liberalizat ion implies that, while the
sovereign state clearly cannot exploit foreign consumers, it can, for a while
at least, continue to squeeze its domestic cons.urners; it also means that
domestic entrepreneu rs once they had demonstrate d their competitive ness in
foreign markets were less fearful of going head to head with foreigners in the
domestic market at a later point.

It is also true that part of the pragmatism

in evidence here is that as a system becomes more complicated in terms of both
the numbers of dome~tic and imported goods in the total basket it becomes
increasingl y difficult for civil servants to make the necessary decisions on
selective import controls, preferentia l target industries, credit allocations ,
etc.

Thus in both Korea and Taiwan import controls were gradually liberalized

and tariff rates reduced, even though the observed oscillation s are more

\
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sustained and wider in the case of Korea, given its more serious. political
instability as well as its perhaps less moderate reaction to external shocks.
It is well to remember, moreover, that, contrary to situations in most
other LDC's, the overvalued exchange rate was no longer used to transfer
incomes from primary product exporters.to the new urban industrial class in the
East Asian NIC's.

This is true in part because institutional flexibility

permitted a change in policies; it is also true in part because here natural
resources, often used to fuel an increasingly inefficient development process,
were basically scarce, and foreign aid, important in helping to bring inflation
under control in the SO's, was terminated in the early 60's in the case of
Taiwan and reduced substantially in Korea.

In other words, rents to continue

to fuel special favors for non competitive industries could no longer be
counted on dependably, and a change in the policy mix emerged as in the
national interest.
Our hypothesis about the continued flexibility of institutional change in
the East Asian NICts is even more in evidence in the period since about 1970
when primary export substitution yielded to secondary import and export
substitution with the exhaustion of the labor surplus.

The pragmatic

orientation of a system relatively uninhibited by synthetic nationalism has led
to a continued role for governments, pointed in the direction of flexibility in

institutional construction as well as institutional reform.
This phenomenon could be observed in the fields of educat_ion, science and

technology, agriculture, control of capital moven:ents, etc. all areas sensitive
to continuously new problems brought about by the requirements of transition

growth. For example, once the labor surplus condition had bascially been
terminated in the early 70's, the East Asian NIC's entered a situation in which
the need for further development of their human r~sources placed much greater
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emphasis on the quality dimension s of growth, including skilled labor and high
talent man-power generally as well as requiring more support from the system's
science and technolog y infrastru cture.

In Taiwan, for example, compulsor y

education was extended to 9 years in 1968, vocationa l education and manpower
training was promoted by 1970; the Korean Institute of Science and Technolog y
was establish ed in the late 60's; and in both economies the old science and

technolog y institute s were revamped and new criteria establish ed forcing
activity to become more closely linked to the market instead of following
internali zed "big science" criteria.

Given the importanc e appropria tely

attached to the routinize d contribut ion of science and technolog y to modern
growth this emphasis on education , training and the appropria teness.of
technolog y choice and the direction of technolog y change constitut ed an
important ingredien t in permittin g the East Asian systems to navigate
successfu lly in their transitio n efforts.
Establish ing the infrastru cture and providing the appropria te rules of thP
game for these institutio nal activitie s is clearly a public sector activity,
i.e. appropria te initial institutio nal choices and institutio nal flexibili ty
over time are essential to the success of directly productiv e private
activitie s in both agricultu re and non-agric ulture.

This same institutio nal

flexibili ty was demonstra ted in Taiwan whose governmen t first promulga ted a
major three tier land reform in the early 50's but, once labor shortage
condition s had come into play in the early 70's, shifted to a second land
reform by the late 70's, a package which included the promotion of joint farm
manageme nt, contract farming, the enlargeme nt of farm size through land
consolida tion schemes, and other realistic responses to a changing factor
endowmen t.

The same institutio nal flexibili ty is in evidence in

non-agric ulture.

Not only was decentral ized industry encourage d by the rural
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orien tation of gover nment infra struc tural alloc ation
s (road s, elect ricity ,
etc.) but the estab lishm ent of expor t proce ssing zones
and the encou ragem ent of
bonde d wareh ousin g servin g as an exten sion of that conce
pt facil itate d the
forei gn raw mater ials based expor t subst itutio n drive
. At the same time the
credi t and techn ologi cal netwo rking provi ded via the
JCRR /farm ers' assoc iation
struc ture and the estab lishm ent of indus trial estat es
assis ted subst antia lly in
encou ragin g the growt h of dome stical ly orien ted rural
indus tries based on
dome stic raw mate rials. In both areas the natur e of
the East Asian paten t
system inclu ding the great er flexi bility of paten t offic
es and the great er
unwil lingn ess to let foreig n multi -natio nals use paten
ts for block ing purpo ses
were helpf ul. In this area there is perha ps more interv
entio n in evide nce in
the case of the East Asian NIC's than in Latin Amer
ica, but it is_ of the
accom modat ing type. .One may assum e that the East Asian
s are looki ng to the
Japan ese case in which the legal struc ture, inclu ding
that of a lower
thresh old/lo wer cost type of paten t, the utili ty model
, prove d very effec tive
in encou raging medium and small scale or blue colla r
type of innov ation al ·
activ ity.
The East Asian NIC's have under taken relat ively few
organ izatio nal reform s
in the.c redit marke t area. Both system s are only now
engag ed in an effor t to
broad en these marke ts and provi de for more speci alize
d insti tutio ns, inclu ding
the estab lishm ent of bond marke ts and organ ized money
marke ts, with the help of
appro priate instit ution al innov ation s. Priva te bcmks
have becom e somew hat more
comp etitiv e even thoug h they are heavi ly prote cted and
incre asing ly indep enden t
of the gover nment contr olled "comm ercial " banki ng system
. The estab lishm ent o:::
such addit ional fin~n cial instit ution s is undou btedly
a prere quisi te for a
subst antia lly less repre ssed credi t marke t. The impor
tant point to be made
here is that the liber aliza tion of the credi t marke t
had to be accom plishe d
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very gradually, with the market initially stratified according to size and

credit-worthiness, as the notion of an equilibrium prime rate has begun to
emerge only in recent years.

This is particularly interesting since it

coincides with McKinnon's recent "second thoughts" about jumping to a fully
equilibrium interest rate strategy too early in the development process because
of the problems of adverse risk selection etc.
The same general observation can be made with respect to international
capital markets.

East Asian NIC's realized quite early that foreign investment

had a positive role to play and should be encouraged by statute.

Nevertheless,

the kind of liberalization that one often reads about did not take place.
Restrictions continued to be in vogue and substantial DFI flows began in
earnest on Taiwan only after the termination of U.S. aid in the early 60's.
Only gradually do we witness the institutionalization of direct investment via
further reductions of government restrictions on foreign firm operations,
including on export prohibitions, ·as well as the positive government
encouragement of joint ventures as domestic capability increased.

The

domestic financial market today still provides inadequate scope for operations
by foreign banks.
It is, moreover, interesting to briefly examine the organization for
planning by the government in the East Asian NIC cases.

In Taiwan, while the

locus for government planning shifted from the Council of International
Economic Cooperation and Development in 1963 to the Economic Planning Council
in 1973, economic cevelopment plans continued to be compiled but were
increasingly viewed as think pieces or general guidelines in the vein of the
French indicative plans to convey a sense of national purpose, not in any sense
mandatory or regulatory.

In fact, when the planning machinery was once again

reorganized in 1977, this time into the Council of Economic Planning and
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Development, it became even less concerned with formal resource oriented
planning and more with policy debates and the pragmatic formulation of future
attitudes towards the private sector, comparable to the functions of the U.S.
Council of Economic Advisors.

This is somewhat different in the case of Korea

where the Economic Planning Board has had more regulatory functions at any
point in time but with the same trend being exhibited over time.
Finally, of course, there is the issue of the so-called "repressive" labor
market situation in East Asia compared to that of other LDC's.

It is quite

clear that labor legislation, including dealing with employment, labor
relations and working conditions, retirement benefits, minimum wage
legislation, etc. has generally not been on the front burner in East Asia and
thus has not raised the real cost of labor. The government clearly seems to
have kept in'mind the importance of participation by the working class, i.e.
working class incomes rather than w~ge rates by individual elite working class
members, all of which is much easier to accomplish when there is no strong
union organization.

It is my strongly held view. that unions in any case derive

their power from government in labor surplus situ~tions and that the nexus of
union wage legislation and government intervention on behalf of the worker is
very often one of thG major signs of synthetic nationalism and may be
counter-produc tive with respect to the very people it is meant to help.

Section IV

Some Final Thoughts

It should, of course, be remembered that all economies move along
ambiguous, uncertain and non-monotonic paths, usmllly lurching forward in one
direction, sometimes sideways, often partially retracing their steps.
Moreover, they are much too complicated organisms in the institutional and
narrowly economic sense to be neatly packaged either into well defined
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transitiona l subphases or alternative institution al decision making paths.
·These are all matters of subtle differentia tion among shades of grey, rather
than black and white.

But even given the recognition of all this subtlety of

real world differences it is, nevertheles s interesting to note the particularl y
flexible choices made by the East Asian NIC's which stood them in such good
stead over

time.

Initial conditions have to be examined relative to a certain point in time
because we can't trace the problem back to Adam and Eve.

Given those initial

conditions we do not believe in inevitable sequences or unbreakable straight
jackets; but we do adhere to the notion that organizatio nal and policy choice
over time is very much conditioned by where systems find themselves_ at the
outset, both in terms of the more conventiona l indices of factor endowments,
size of country, etc. as well as in the nature of the obstructing or
accommodati ng institution al heritage which we have been emphasizing in this
paper.

Accommodati ng institution al changes, furthering the objective of the

majority of the participant s in the process of transition, represent perhaps
the most important ingredient in developmen tal success.

The East Asians may

have had good luck in terms of their initial human conditions but they also
built on that initial good luck with the proper institution al actions which
gave them the necessary flexibility over time, i.e. once something did not wo·::-k
they were willing to change it.

For example, when import substitutio n came t:J

an end in the late 50' s on Taiwan there was a p~eat deal of filling and backing
in an effort to cartelize, or regulate the market; ultimately, under the
pressure of the scarcity of natural resources and the signal that foreign aid
was about to be t~rminated, the institution al milieu was changed to accommodate
the shift to a labor intensive export orientation .

Once again later, after the

labor surplus had been used up, these systems provided policy and institutionH l
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change to permit the easing into a more technology, educated labor and capital
intensive phase of production and exports.
Here as elsewhere import substitution constituted an early important
element of post-independence nationalism.

But, unlike elsewhere, that

nationalism did not require intervention on a quasi-permanent basis but was
consistent with an early effort to gradually liberalize by indicating an
understanding that the identification between colonialism and the market
mechanism is overdrawn, as is the identification between organic nationalism
and direct controls.

In fact, a willingness not to give up on political

nationalism but to let it manifest itself in the non-economic arena was clearly
in evidence in the East Asian NIC's.
In the absence of a dependable flow of natural resource intensive exports
over time and/or generous foreigners willing to provide foreign capital for the
asking, it became relatively easy for institutions to be established which
would

help convince industrialists; the effort had to be made sooner or later

to shift towards large volumes of competitive exports and away from the small
volume/large profit margin domestic market syndrome, useful for the
reallocation of rtnts f~om the agricultural to the industrial sector.

It was

similarly easy to convince workers that they might be better off with larger
wage incomes resulting from having more members of working families employed
rather than the alternative high wage rates for only the employed heads of
households.

And it was easier yet to explain to other civil servants whose

power and sometimes extra incomes were severely affected by any even gradual
trend toward liberalization that the alternatives were not available in the
long run.

Thus, lacing a decline in the rate of industrial growth and the

threat of competi~ive price wars or cartelization at the end of the import
substitution phase, policy makers in the East Asian NIC's made flexible
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..:institutional choices accommodating changes in the economic environment.

The

so frequently encountered entrenched habits and.strong vested interests of hot

bouse·industrialization never had a chance to flourish.
In the Toynbee sense of challenge/response the East Asian NIC's, in fact,
had an easier problem.

There was no real alternative for them but to build

institutions that would tend to mobilize their human resources over time, first
unskilled, then skilled, on behalf of the transition growth effort.

This

included not only the provision of infra-structure and, most importantly, its
equitable allocation as between urban and rural claimants but also the creation
of special facilities such as export processing zones, bonded warehousing,
rural credit institutions, the support of farme~s' associations and cooperative
banks, increasing assistance for information diffusion on appropriate
technologies; markets, etc. with respect to both process and attribute choices
and, even on a time limited basis, help where economies of scale or

externalities could Ge demonstrated to be important, e.g. in the case of
financial markets.
It seems increasingly clear, and not just in East Asia, that the
mobilization of large numbers of economic actors is difficult to undertake
either in rich or poor countries, East or West, North or South. The East Asian

NIC's recognized that-a strong government was essential but that its
willingness to exercise self restraint in selecting the areas in which it could
effectively intervene and where it could not represented the key to building an
accommodating institutional structure.

In the absence of this institutional

capacity the path to modern growth becomes much more difficult for developing
countries and much more painful for the vast majority of their populations.

